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INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1960s, when the first laws were enacted re-
quiring installation of seat belts in automobiles, courts and leg-
islatures across the country have struggled with the issue of
what effect failure to wear a seat belt should have upon an in-
jured person's right to recovery in a civil lawsuit arising from
an automobile accident. In lawsuits against other drivers, stat-
utes and case law have taken a variety of approaches. These
range from totally banning evidence relating to seat belts to
allowing failure to wear a seat belt to be a comparative negli-
gence factor or a defense to reduce a plaintiff's damages.
Minnesota Statutes section 169.685 was first enacted in
1963. It requires that, after January 1, 1964, all new motor
vehicles be equipped with seat belts in the front seat. The stat-
ute as enacted in 1963 did not require the use of seat belts. In
fact, subdivision 4 of the statute, hereinafter referred to as the
"seat belt evidence gag rule," provided that proof of the fail-
ure to use seat belts would be inadmissible in litigation arising
from the operation of a motor vehicle. In 1981, section
169.685 was amended to require parents to equip their vehi-
cles with child passenger restraint systems, and subdivision 4
was amended accordingly. That has been the only amendment
to that section since 1963. Minnesota Statutes section
169.685, subdivision 4, currently provides as follows:
Proof of the use or failure to use seat belts or a child passen-
ger restraint system as described in subd. 5, or proof of the
installation or failure of installation of seat belts or a child
passenger restraint system as described in subd. 5 shall not
be admissible in evidence in any litigation involving per-
sonal injuries or property damage resulting from the use or
operation of any motor vehicle.
The adoption of the seat belt evidence gag rule paralleled
the legislature's choice in 1963 not to require the use of seat
belts. The legislature's refusal to establish a statutory duty to
wear a seat belt is consistent with the legislature's refusal to
penalize individuals in civil litigation for failure to wear a seat
belt.
Since the adoption of section 169.685, subdivision 4, the
legislature has never looked at the seat belt evidence gag rule
in relation to changes in the law or public policy which have
[Vol. 15
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occurred during this period. These changes include the adop-
tion of comparative fault, the emergence of the crashworthi-
ness doctrine, and the growing recognition of the effectiveness
of seat belts in preventing injuries. The lack of guidance in the
statutory language and legislative history as to whether the
seat belt evidence gag rule should apply in crashworthiness
cases makes this question ripe for judicial determination.
In 1968, the United States Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
led the nation by adopting the "crashworthiness" or "second
collision" doctrine in the case of Larsen v. General Motors Corp.'
The crashworthiness doctrine imposes a duty on automobile
manufacturers to foresee the occurrence of accidents and to
produce automobiles that are able to diminish or prevent inju-
ries resulting from the "second collision" of the passenger
with the interior of the vehicle. 2 Since Larsen, thirty-seven
states have now specifically adopted the doctrine, and there are
no longer any states refusing to recognize the doctrine. 3
National awareness regarding the use of seat belts had
barely begun to develop at the time of the Larsen decision and
has only developed slowly during the long period of time
thereafter. 4 In the early 1980s, however, the value placed
upon seat belt use by passengers has greatly increased, as re-
flected in the current trend to mandate seat belt use.5
Most courts, including Minnesota's, have yet to face the is-
sue of whether the failure to wear a seat belt should be admis-
sible as evidence in a crashworthiness case. Of the nine state
courts that have specifically faced the issue, all have held that
evidence of seat belt nonuse is admissible in crashworthiness
cases, even where there was prior case or statutory law pre-
cluding the seat belt defense in non-crashworthiness cases.6
1. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
2. See id. at 502.
3. The thirty-seven states which have expressly adopted the crashworthiness
doctrine are as follows: Alabama; Arizona; California; Colorado; Connecticut; Flor-
ida; Georgia; Idaho; Illinois; Indiana; Iowa; Kentucky; Louisiana; Maryland; Massa-
chusetts; Michigan; Minnesota; Mississippi; Missouri; Montana; Nebraska; New
Jersey; New Mexico; New York; North Dakota; Ohio; Oklahoma; Oregon; Rhode Is-
land; South Carolina; South Dakota; Tennessee; Texas; Virginia; Washington; Wis-
consin; and Wyoming.
4. See Werber, A Multi-Disciplinary Approach To Seat Belt Issues, 29 CLEV. ST. L.
REv. 217, 220 (1980).
5. See the Seat Belt Chart appearing at the end of this article.
6. The nine states which have faced the issue of admissibility of failure to wear a
seat belt in a crashworthiness case have done so in the following cases: Wilson v.
1989]
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Clearly a trend toward the admissibility of such evidence has
begun.
This article analyzes the history and current status of legisla-
tive and common law treatment of seat belt evidence in
crashworthiness cases on a national level. It then focuses on
the Minnesota seat belt law and the reasons evidence of seat
belt nonuse should be admissible in crashworthiness cases in
Minnesota.
I. THE NATIONAL TREND Is TOWARD ADMISSION OF SEAT
BELT EVIDENCE IN CRASHWORTHINESS CASES
In non-crashworthiness cases, courts across the country have
taken widely divergent positions on the admissibility and effect
of evidence of failure to wear seat belts. Some jurisdictions
have held that evidence of failure to wear seat belts is com-
pletely inadmissible.7 Some jurisdictions have held that evi-
dence of failure to wear a seat belt is inadmissible to prove
negligence on the part of an injured plaintiff, but is admissible
on the issue of mitigation of a plaintiff's damages.8 A minority
of jurisdictions have held that failure to wear a seat belt can
constitute contributory negligence. 9
Wisconsin courts have long accepted the seat belt defense in
Volkswagen of America, Inc., 445 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Va. 1978); Daly v. General
Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978); Volkswagen
v. Long, 476 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1985); Seward v. Griffin, 116 Ill. App. 3d 749, 452
N.W.2d 558 (1983); McElroy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 420 So. 2d 214 (La. Ct. App. 1982);
Lowe v. Estate Motors Ltd., 428 Mich. 439, 410 N.W.2d 706 (1987); Siren v. Behan,
224 NJ. Super. 130, 539 A.2d 1244 (1988); Dahl v. BMW, 304 Or. 558, 748 P.2d 77
(1987); Foley v. City of West Allis, 113 Wis. 2d 475, 335 N.W.2d 824 (1983).
7. See, e.g., Sours v. General Motors Corp., 717 F.2d 1511 (6th Cir. 1983)(in an
automobile rollover case where plaintiff's theory was based on defective roof, it was
harmless error to exclude evidence of nonuse of seat belt); Vizzini v. Ford Motor Co.,
569 F.2d 754 (3d Cir. 1977)(exclusion of evidence of non-usage of seat belts was
proper); Churning v. Staples, 628 P.2d 180 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981)(the seat belt de-
fense was not available for purposes of determining the degree of plaintiff's negli-
gence under the comparative negligence statute); Taplin v. Clark, 6 Kan. App. 2d 66,
626 P.2d 1198 (1981)(evidence of nonuse is inadmissible under the Comparative
Negligence Doctrine either on the issue of contributory negligence or in mitigation
of damages);Jeep Corp. v. Murray, 101 Nev. 640, 708 P.2d 297 (1985)(trial court did
not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence concerning nonuse of seat belts in a
rollover case based on strict liability).
8. Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 647 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1981) (failure to
wear seat belts should be considered by the jury only in assessing damages).
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both crashworthiness and non-crashworthiness cases. The
Supreme Court of Wisconsin has adopted an explicit set of
rules for handling cases in which the seat belt defense is
raised.'0 Courts which have allowed the seat belt defense in
ordinary negligence cases have applied the same principles in
crashworthiness cases." In six states where the seat belt de-
fense had not been recognized previously, seat belt evidence
was held to be admissible in crashworthiness cases. No court
which has directly confronted the issue of the admissibility of
seat belt evidence in a crashworthiness case has refused to al-
low it. However, the courts which have ruled seat belt evi-
dence admissible in crashworthiness cases have taken differing
approaches to the use of that evidence.
The courts of New Jersey and Louisiana, neither of which
had previously allowed the seat belt defense, did allow evi-
dence of the installation and availability of seat belts in vehicles
in crashworthiness cases for the purpose of determining
whether the vehicle was crashworthy. In the New Jersey case,
Siren v. Behan, 12 the plaintiff's decedent had been ejected and it
was alleged that the ejection was due to a defectively designed
door latch. The court recognized that there was no statutory
or common law duty to wear a seat belt at the time the accident
occurred, but it held the jury must be allowed to consider the
existence and recommended usage of seat belts available in the
vehicle when applying the risk-utility analysis to the design de-
fect issue."1 In the Louisiana case, McElroy v. Allstate Insurance
Co. ,14 it was alleged that a design defect in a door allowed the
plaintiff's decedent to be ejected. The defendant automobile
manufacturer maintained that the overall design of the vehicle,
which included all of its restraint devices, was such that no de-
fect existed. 15 The court upheld an instruction given by the
trial court that the jury must consider the automobile as a
whole in determining whether it was properly designed, taking
into account all of the features designed for the purpose of
keeping passengers inside the automobile in collisions. These
10. See Foley v. City of West Allis, 113 Wis. 2d 475, 335 N.W.2d 824 (1983).
11. See, e.g., Insurance Co. of North America v. Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447 (Fla.
1984); Seward v. Griffin, 116 I1. App. 3d 749, 452 N.E.2d 558 (1983).
12. 224 N.J. Super. 130, 539 A.2d 1244 (1988).
13. See id. at 136-38, 539 A.2d at 1247-48.
14. 420 So. 2d 214 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
15. Id. at 217.
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design features included seat belts.' 6 The court held that, in
this light, evidence of the existence of seat belts was properly
before the jury.
17
In Wilson v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.,18 a federal court, ap-
plying Virginia law, admitted evidence that the vehicle was
equipped with seat belts for the purpose of determining
whether the automobile was defectively designed. 19 The jury
was instructed that it must consider whether the automobile as
a whole was defective and unreasonably dangerous. 20 Addition-
ally, even though Virginia had a statute specifically providing
that failure to use seat belts would not be deemed to be negli-
gence, the court held that evidence of the plaintiff's nonuse of
seat belts would be admitted for consideration by the jury in
mitigation of plaintiff's damages. 2 1 The court held that the
statute, which was in derogation of the common law, was to be
strictly construed, and that it did not on its face bar the intro-
duction of seat belt evidence for the purpose of determining a
defect or mitigating damages. 22
The courts of three states, Oregon, California, and Michi-
gan, overruled contrary case law in admitting seat belt evi-
dence, both on the issue of defect and to show comparative
fault on the part of the plaintiff. In Dahl v. BMW,23 the Oregon
Supreme Court criticized an earlier case which had held there
was no common law duty to wear seat belts. Prior to Dahl, the
Oregon Legislature had enacted a comparative fault statute
which the Dahl court used as authority in allowing the seat belt
defense.2 4 Under the principles of comparative fault, the court
held that the fact finder must determine whether the plaintiff's
conduct was reasonable under the circumstances and the fail-
ure to use a seat belt could be considered in determining the
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 445 F. Supp. 1368 (E.D. Va. 1978).
19. Id. at 1371.
20. Id. (citing Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795, 800 (8th Cir. 1976))(em-
phasis in original).
21. Id. at 1374. The Virginia statute provides that "[flailure to use such safety
lap belts or a combination of lap belts and shoulder straps or harnesses after installa-
tion shall not deemed to be negligence .... " VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-309.1(b) (1988).
22. Wilson, 445 F. Supp. at 1374.
23. 304 Or. 558, 748 P.2d 77 (1987).
24. Id. at 568, 748 P.2d at 83.
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reasonableness of the plaintiff's actions.25
Similarly, the Supreme Court of California in Daly v. General
Motors Corp. ,26 held that in future cases California would apply
the doctrine of comparative fault to strict liability actions, and
a plaintiff's own fault would be compared with that of the
product manufacturer. 27 In considering the seat belt defense
issue, the court held that the plaintiff's own conduct relative to
the product could be determined to be comparative fault by
the jury.28 Regarding the evidence of the availability of seat
belts in the vehicle, the court concluded that the jury, in con-
sidering the design defect issue, must determine whether the
vehicle's overall design, including safety features provided in
the vehicle, made it crashworthy. 29 Because the Daly court
adopted comparative fault prospectively, the trial court's deci-
sion to submit the seat belt defense to the jury was reversed. 30
However, the comparative fault principles and seat belt issues
would apply in the re-trial of the case.3 1
The Supreme Court of Michigan announced a similar hold-
ing in Lowe v. Estate Motors Ltd. ,32 overruling contrary case law
and allowing seat belt evidence on the issue of defect and to
show comparative fault on the part of the plaintiff.
33
The trend is apparent. In accordance with this country's in-
creasing awareness of the effectiveness of seat belts in prevent-
ing injuries in automobile accidents and the trend toward
requiring seat belt use, more and more courts are requiring
plaintiffs to bear the burden of their failure to take the simple
precaution of fastening their seat belts. Especially in
crashworthiness cases, where the plaintiff is alleging that the
automobile manufacturer failed to design its vehicle to be safe
in collisions, the courts are recognizing that manufacturers
25. Id.
26. 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978).
27. Id. at 742-43, 575 P.2d at 1172-73, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 390-91. California's
legislature enacted a pure comparative fault statute. This type of comparative fault
statute allows a plaintiff to recover the percentage of damages for which he was not at
fault or has accounted for in some other way. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d
804, 532 P.2d 1226, 113 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
28. Daly, 20 Cal. 3d at 742, 575 P.2d at 1172, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
29. See id. at 746, 575 P.2d at 1174-75, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 392-93.
30. Id. at 745-46, 575 P.2d at 1173-74, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 392-93.
31. Id. at 744, 575 P.2d at 1173, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
32. 428 Mich. 439, 410 N.W.2d 706 (1987).
33. Id. at 475-76, 410 N.W.2d at 721.
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must receive the benefit of their incorporation of seat belts as
an integral part of the safety features in the vehicle.
II. MINNESOTA'S SEAT BELT EVIDENCE GAG RULE SHOULD
NOT APPLY IN CRASHWORTHINESS CASES
A. The Seat Belt Evidence Gag Rule Does Not Exclude Evidence of
the Installation and Availability of Seat Belts in
Crashworthiness Cases
Minnesota Statutes section 169.685, subdivision 4 provides
as follows: "Proof of the use or failure to use seat belts.., shall
not be admissible in evidence in any litigation involving per-
sonal injuries or property damage resulting from the use or
operation of any motor vehicle." 34 The statute does not on its
face exclude evidence that seat belts were available and usable
in the vehicle. It also does not specifically state that it applies
to litigation involving personal injuries allegedly resulting
from the design of the crash protection or occupant retention
systems of a vehicle.
The statute should not be given any broader scope than its
own wording justifies.3 5 Strict construction is as appropriate
with the Minnesota statute as it was with the Virginia statute in
Wilson v. Volkswagen of America, Inc. 36 The statute in Wilson pro-
vided that failure to use a seat belt would not be deemed negli-
gence. 37 The plaintiffs argued that the statute should preclude
all evidence regarding seat belts, including evidence that there
were seat belts in the vehicle. The court rejected that argu-
ment, holding that seat belt evidence would be admissible both
on the issue of defect and the issue of mitigation of damages. 38
The court stated:
34. MINN. STAT. § 169.685, subd. 4 (1988).
35. See MINN. STAT. § 645.16 (1988)(stating that unambiguous statutes are to be
strictly construed to their literal meaning); see also McCaleb v. Jackson, 307 Minn. 15,
18, 239 N.W.2d 187, 189 (1976)(where language of a statute clearly establishes statu-
tory meaning, further statutory construction is not allowed); State v. Theo. Hamm
Brewing Co., 247 Minn. 486, 497, 78 N.W.2d 664, 670 (1956)(where statutory lan-
guage is plain, simple, and unambiguous courts are required to follow clear statutory
directions); Lahr v. City of St. Cloud, 246 Minn. 489, 494 n.10, 76 N.W.2d 119, 122
n.9 (1956)(the "plain meaning rule" still prevails in Minnesota); State ex rel. Bergin
V. Washburn, 224 Minn. 269, 274, 28 N.W.2d 652, 655 (1947) (statutory interpreta-
tion is not permitted where language is clear).
36. Wilson, 445 F. Supp. 1368, 1374 (E.D. Va. 1978).
37. See VA. CODE ANN. § 46.1-309.1(6) (1988).
38. Wilson, 445 F. Supp. at 1374.
[Vol. 15
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The reasonableness or unreasonableness of a person's ac-
tions with respect to any issue is generally a factual question
and at common law would be decided by the trier of fact.
As a statute written in derogation of the common law is to
be strictly construed .... the Court will not extend the stat-
ute in question beyond its clear meaning.
39
The Minnesota statute clearly indicates that it is to apply
only in cases involving personal injuries resulting from the use
or operation of a motor vehicle. 40 The statute does not ad-
dress cases involving injuries allegedly resulting from the de-
sign of a vehicle's crash protection systems. 41 The statute's
language only bars the admissibility of use or failure to use a
seat belt. It does not bar evidence of the manufacturer's inclu-
sion of seat belts in the design of the vehicle nor their availabil-
ity at the time of the accident. The statute should be given
only its literal meaning, and nothing more.
B. The Policy Reasons Which Were the Basis for the Adoption of the
Seat Belt Evidence Gag Rule No Longer Exist, Especially
in Crashworthiness Cases
In 1963, when Minnesota Statutes section 169.685 was en-
acted, the importance of seat belts in automobiles was only be-
ginning to be perceived. For the first time, the effectiveness of
seat belts in preventing injury was thought to be important
enough that people should at least be given the option of wear-
ing seat belts by requiring that they be installed in vehicles.
However, at that time, the Minnesota Legislature did not im-
pose any requirement that seat belts be worn. That has now
changed with the enactment of Minnesota's mandatory seat
belt law.4 2
Minnesota courts have never addressed the seat belt defense
because of the existence of the seat belt evidence gag rule.
Courts in other jurisdictions which have refused to allow the
seat belt defense have relied on several different reasons for
their refusal, some of which were undoubtedly reasons for
Minnesota's adoption of the gag rule. Those reasons included
the lack of a duty to wear a seat belt, uncertainty as to the effec-
39. Id. (citation omitted).
40. See MINN. STAT. § 169.685, subd. 4 (1988).
41. See id.
42. MINN. STAT. § 169.686 (1988).
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tiveness of seat belts, and the perceived potential for jury con-
fusion.4 3 Seat belts have now been available in cars for two
decades and the reasons for refusing to accept the seat belt
defense no longer exist.
1. The Duty to Wear a Seat Belt is Now Widely Recognized
As was noted earlier, none of the cases in other jurisdictions
which refused to find a duty to wear a seat belt involved the
issue of crashworthiness. Instead, they were automobile negli-
gence cases in which defendant drivers asserted a seat belt de-
fense against unbelted plaintiffs. Several courts held that the
plaintiff had no common law duty to protect himself from the
defendant's negligence by wearing a seat belt. Under the prin-
ciple of contributory negligence, which totally bars recovery if
the plaintiff was at all negligent, it was considered unjust to bar
a plaintiff's recovery against a negligent defendant solely be-
cause the plaintiff was not wearing a seat belt. An increasing
number of courts have reconsidered these holdings, especially
in crashworthiness cases in jurisdictions which have adopted
comparative fault. Thirty-two state legislatures have now es-
tablished a duty to wear seat belts by enacting mandatory seat
belt laws.
44
In Lowe v. Estate Motors Ltd. ,45 the Michigan Supreme Court
overruled an earlier case called Romankewiz v. Black.46 The
court in Romankewiz had found no duty to wear a seat belt be-
cause the statute requiring automobiles to be equipped with
seat belts "impose[d] no sanctions for failure to use a seat
belt." 47 The Romankewiz court also noted that statistics demon-
strated that only 15 percent of drivers wore their seat belts and
that seat belts actually exacerbated injuries. 48 The court fur-
ther reasoned that there was no duty to wear a seat belt be-
cause one is not required to anticipate that the negligence of
43. See Hearings Before the Senate Transportation Committee (March 4, 16, 28, 1983);
Hearings Before the House Transportation Committee (March 9, 1983); Hearings Before the
House Highway Safety Subcommittee (March 1, 7, 1983) (tapes on file at the Legislative
Reference Library).
44. Status Report, 22 INS. INST. FOR Hwy. SAFETY 4 (Dec. 5, 1987). See also infra
Seat Belt Chart.
45. 428 Mich. 439, 410 N.W.2d 706 (1987).
46. 16 Mich. App. 119, 167 N.W.2d 606 (1969).
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another would cause an accident.49
In overruling Romankewiz, the Lowe court noted the majority
view in comparative negligence jurisdictions that juries were
allowed to consider the seat belt nonuse defense. 50 The court
in Lowe was no longer impressed with the fact that there was no
statutory requirement to wear belts, "[n]oting that tort law is
peculiarly nonstatutory and that the court had not hesitated in
the past in overturning unsound precedent in the area of tort
law. '" 5 ' Regarding the contention that the effectiveness of seat
belts was too speculative, the Lowe court stated that "the evi-
dence of seat belt effectiveness 'in reducing deaths and injury
severity was substantial and unequivocal.' "52 The Lowe court
then cited the crashworthiness doctrine which expressly ac-
knowledges that automobile collisions are foreseeable. 53 Fur-
ther, the court recognized that under the law of comparative
negligence, every person has an obligation to exercise reason-
able care for his own safety. In contrast to the old contributory
negligence rule, comparative negligence does not allow a neg-
ligent defendant to entirely avoid liability. Summing up its
reasons for overruling Romankewiz, the Lowe court stated:
It cannot be seriously contended that automobile passen-
gers are under no obligation whatsoever to exercise due
care for their own safety because accidents are unforesee-
able. The speciousness of such a contention is particularly
reflected in the present case in which one of plaintiff's the-
ories of liability is indeed premised upon the foreseeability
of automobile accidents.
54
These same reasons were cited as the basis for the holdings
that wearing a seat belt is an element of the duty to exercise
reasonable care for one's own safety in Dahl v. BMW,55 Wilson
49. Id. at 125, 167 N.W.2d at 610 (quoting Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228,
233-34, 160 S.E.2d 65, 70 (1968)).
50. 428 Mich. at 451-55, 410 N.W.2d at 711-12.
51. Id. at 452-53, 410 N.W.2d at 711 (quoting Insurance Co. of North America v.
Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d 447, 451 (Fla. 1984)).
52. Id. at 453, 410 N.W.2d at 711-12 (agreeing with and quoting Pasakarnis, 451
So. 2d at 453).
53. Id. at 453, 410 N.W.2d at 712 (citing Pasakarnis, 451 So. 2d at 453).
54. Id. at 460, 410 N.W.2d at 715.
55. 304 Or. 558, 564-65, 748 P.2d 77, 81 (1987)(plaintiffs must still act reason-
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v. Volkswagen, 56 Bentzler v. Braun,57 and Insurance Co. of North
America v. Pasakarnis.58
2. The Effectiveness of Seat Belts in Preventing Injuries
is Now Recognized
There is an ever-increasing trend in the United States to-
ward recognizing and understanding the importance of using
seat belts. In June 1983, research conducted by the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) revealed that
69.6% of the people in the United States had seen or heard
advertisements concerning the importance of using safety
belts. 59 In the Progress and Assessment Report of the Na-
tional Safety Belt Usage Program, the NHTSA discussed in de-
tail the growth of awareness and interest in the use and
effectiveness of safety belts and child safety seats. 60 This re-
port reflects a marked increase in knowledge, attitude, aware-
ness, and self-reported use. National Safety Belt Surveys,
taken in 1981 and 1983, have indicated that self-reported use
of safety belts, though still not a majority, increased from
about 24% to about 33%.61 "The increase is an indication of
improving public attitudes regarding belt use. " 62
In 1964, front seat lap belts were installed in all cars as stan-
dard equipment, but only fourteen states required them.63
Now, however, virtually every state requires seat belts as stan-
dard equipment.64 By 1983, at least twenty-five states had in-
troduced mandatory seat belt legislation, and presently thirty-
two states and the District of Columbia have enacted
mandatory seat belt use laws.65 All mandatory use statutes
56. 445 F. Supp. 1368, 1373 (E.D. Va. 1978)(seat belts afford plaintiff opportu-
nity to mitigate his damages).
57. 34 Wis. 2d 362, 384-85, 149 N.W.2d 626, 639 (1967)(duty to use available
seat belts is based on common law standard of ordinary care independent of statu-
tory mandate).
58. 451 So. 2d 447, 454 (Fla. 1984)(nonuse of seat belts may amount to failure to
use reasonable care on part of plaintiff).
59. NATIONAL SAFETY BELT USAGE PROGRAM, NATL. Hwy. TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN.,
PROGRESS AND ASSESSMENT REPORT ii (Sept. 1983) [hereinafter NHTSA Report].
60. See generally id.
61. Id. at ii.
62. Id.
63. Warner, Bags, Buckles and Belts: The Debate over Mandatory Passive Restraints in
Automobiles, 8 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y AND LAw, 44, 47 (1983)(footnote omitted).
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originally included, or have been amended to include, an ac-
companying fine.
66
It can no longer be seriously disputed that seat belts are a
highly effective means of reducing injuries and deaths in traffic
accidents. The latest accident data, as acquired through the
NHTSA, indicates that the reduction in traffic fatalities be-
tween 1980 and 1982 was approximately 147o.67 "The decline
began in early 1981 and continued through the beginning of
1982."68 This decline correlates with the increased awareness
and use of seat belts by the general public. "The reasons for
increased use reflect the increased public awareness of the pos-
itive value of safety belts." 69 Past cases which refused to allow
a seat belt defense because the effectiveness of seat belts was
unknown can no longer be considered valid authority.
3. The Seat Belt Defense Need Not Confuse a Jury
Another concern of some courts in refusing to allow the seat
belt defense was that it would create jury confusion. It was
believed that juries would be unable to deal with the appor-
tionment of fault between the negligence of the tortfeasor who
caused the accident and the negligence of the injured plaintiff
who failed to wear a seat belt. This concern is no longer valid.
This type of apportionment is exactly what juries do in
crashworthiness cases. Juries across the country have been
successfully apportioning fault for many years. In any
crashworthiness case, the jury must apportion the fault be-
tween the tortfeasor who caused the accident and the manufac-
turer of a vehicle which is claimed to have caused enhanced
injuries.70 Adding apportionment for injuries caused by fail-
ure to wear a seat belt does not make the determination any
more complicated.
For example, the Wisconsin courts have shown that this kind
of apportionment is not a problem in applying the seat belt
defense under specific procedures established in Foley v. City of
West Allis. 7' These procedures involve a five step approach by
66. See infra Seat Belt Chart.
67. NHTSA Report at 44.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 45.
70. See generally MINN. STAT. § 604.01 (1988).
71. 113 Wis. 2d 475, 335 N.W.2d 824 (1983).
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which the allocation of fault process is laid out. 72
Additionally, the Minnesota Legislature has shown its confi-
dence in jurors' ability to deal with complex damages issues by
enacting the motorcycle helmet law. 73 The helmet statute
states, in pertinent part:
In an action to recover damages for negligence resulting in
any head injury. .. evidence of whether or not the injured
person was wearing protective headgear ... shall be admis-
sible only with respect to the question of damages for head
injuries. Damages for head injuries of any person who was
not wearing protective headgear shall be reduced to the ex-
tent that those injuries could have been avoided by wearing
protective headgear .... 74
It has never been suggested that juries are not capable of con-
sidering the damages issues in motorcycle helmet cases. Like-
wise, juries are capable of handling the analogous
apportionment of damages in seat belt defense cases.
The policy reasons used by courts in refusing to allow the
seat belt defense, some of which were certainly of concern to
the Minnesota Legislature when it adopted the seat belt evi-
dence gag rule, have now become obsolete and have no place
in comparative fault jurisdictions, or in crashworthiness cases.
There is now conclusive evidence that seat belts are an effec-
tive means of preventing injuries. The crashworthiness doc-
trine holds that automobile accidents are foreseeable to
automobile manufacturers. It cannot be disputed, then, that
accidents are also foreseeable to drivers. Thus, wearing a seat
belt is a natural part of an individual's duty to exercise care for
his own safety.
72. Id. at 490, 335 N.W.2d at 831. The five steps involved are as follows:
(1) Determine the causal negligence of each party as to the collision of the
two cars; ... (2) apply comparative negligence principles to eliminate from
liability a defendant whose negligence causing the collision is less than the
contributory negligence of a plaintiff causing the collision;... (3) using the
trier of fact's calculation of the damages, reduce the amount of each plain-
tiff's damages from the liable defendant by the percentage of negligence
attributed to the plaintiff for causing the collision;... (4) determine whether the
plaintif'sfailure to use an available seat belt was negligence and a cause of injury, and
if so what percentage of the total negligence causing the injury was due to the failure to
wear the seat belt; . . . (5) reduce the plaintiff's damages calculated in step (3) by the
percentage of negligence attributed to the plaintiff under step (4)for failure to wear an
available seat belt for causing the injury.
Id. (emphasis added).
73. MINN. STAT. § 169.974 (1988).
74. Id. subd. 6.
[Vol. 15
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C. In Crashworthiness Cases, the Jury Must Consider the Design of
the Vehicle as a Whole
The legal standard in Minnesota for determining whether a
design defect exists is whether the manufacturer has met its
duty to use reasonable care when designing its product. 75 This
standard necessarily entails examination of a product in its en-
tirety. Minnesota law does not suggest that a jury should be
asked to consider some components of a vehicle to the exclu-
sion of others. The only Minnesota case in which the plaintiff
argued that evidence of an available safety device should be
excluded was Buzzell v. Bliss, a product liability action. 76 The
Minnesota Court of Appeals held that use of the safety device
could have prevented the accident, and evidence of the availa-
bility of the safety device, as well as its nonuse, was properly
admitted by the trial court.
77
Minnesota's approach is in accord with cases in other juris-
dictions which have considered this issue specifically in the
context of the admissibility of seat belt evidence in
crashworthiness cases. In California's Daly case, the plaintiffs
challenged a jury instruction which had been given by the trial
court directing that " '[i]n determining whether or not the ve-
hicle was defective you should consider all of the equipment
on the vehicle including any features intended for the safety of
the driver.' "78 Plaintiffs urged that only the precise malfunc-
tioning component itself should be considered in determining
whether the injury was caused by a defectively designed prod-
uct. The Daly court rejected that argument, concluding that
the issue of defective design is to be determined with respect
to the product as a whole. The court stated:
The jury could properly determine whether the Opel's
overall design, including safety features provided in the ve-
hicle, made it "crashworthy," thus rendering the vehicle
nondefective. Product designs do not evolve in a vacuum,
but must reflect the realities of the market place, kitchen,
highway, and shop. Similarly, a product's components are
75. See MINN. JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDE, CIVIL 3D JIG 117 at 81 (1986); see also
Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616 (Minn. 1984).
76. 358 N.W.2d 695 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984)(case involved a product liability ac-
tion brought by injured employee against manufacturer of machine and manufac-
turer of safety device installed on machine).
77. Id. at 700.
78. 575 P.2d at 1174.
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not developed in isolation, but as part of an integrated and
interrelated whole. 79
In a crashworthiness case, the claim is that the manufacturer
failed to use reasonable care in designing its crash protection
or occupant retention systems to prevent injuries in collisions.
The seat belt is an integral and crucial part of any vehicle's
crash protection and occupant restraint systems. Ajury cannot
give meaningful consideration to the adequacy of the design of
these systems without considering the seat belts.
This specific issue was articulately discussed by the Supreme
Court of Michigan in Lowe v. Estate Motors, Ltd. The court
stated:
Evidence of the seat-restraint system goes to the heart of
the issue in crashworthiness cases in which the plaintiff's in-
juries were sustained after being ejected from the vehicle, a
result which seat belts are specifically designed to pre-
vent. . . . [T]he determinative issue of liability concerns
whether the vehicle was unreasonably unsafe because of its
design. Evidence of product safety features specifically
designed to prevent the injuries complained of is entirely
relevant to this issue. No reason, even arguably sound, ex-
ists for excluding such evidence on this liability issue. Plain-
tiff has provided us with none. In crashworthiness cases,
the vehicle is to be considered as an integrated whole. Ac-
cordingly, seat belt evidence is admissible for that purpose.
In the event that this cause proceeds to trial, the jury should
be permitted to consider evidence concerning the seat-re-
straint system, along with all other relevant factors, in deter-
mining whether the vehicle was defective in design pursuant
to plaintiff's crashworthiness theory.80
Even in Louisiana, where failure to wear a seat belt has been
held not to constitute contributory negligence, the Louisiana
Court of Appeals in McElroy v. Allstate Insurance Co., held that
evidence of the existence of the vehicle's seat belt system was
admissible in a crashworthiness case.8' The trial judge had al-
lowed Ford Motor Company to introduce evidence that the au-
tomobile was equipped with a seat belt and that plaintiff was
not wearing it at the time of the accident.8 2 The jury was in-
79. Id. at 1175.
80. 428 Mich. 439, 471-72, 410 N.W.2d 706, 720 (1987).
81. 420 So. 2d 214, 217 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
82. Id. at 216.
[Vol. 15
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structed that it must consider the automobile as a whole, tak-
ing into account all the features designed in the automobile for
the purpose of keeping passengers inside the car in the event
of a collision.8 3 Plaintiffs argued that, since failure to wear a
seat belt could not be contributory negligence, Ford was trying
to do what it would not otherwise be allowed to do in introduc-
ing the seat belt evidence. 84 The appellate court disagreed and
upheld the jury instructions and the admission of the seat belt
evidence. The court concluded:
Ford's defense to the allegations of design defect was that
the vehicle was designed as safely as possible. Ford main-
tains that the design of the vehicle as a whole, including all
of the restraint devices, was such that no defect existed. In
this light, evidence of the existence of seat belts was prop-
erly before the jury. 85
D. The Seat Belt Evidence Gag Rule Violates Due Process When
Applied to Vehicle Manufacturers in Crashworthiness Cases
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion provides that the states may not deprive any person of
property without due process of law.8 6 It was long ago estab-
lished that a corporation has a right to this protection. 87 Arti-
cle I, Section 7, of the Minnesota Constitution contains a
similar due process clause, 88 and Article I, Section 8, of the
Minnesota Constitution entitles every person "to obtain justice
freely and without purchase, completely and without denial,
promptly and without delay, conformable to the laws." 8 9
Application of the seat belt evidence gag rule to a vehicle
manufacturer in a crashworthiness case, which denies the man-
ufacturer the right to present evidence that it designed its vehi-
cle with a simple and highly effective means of occupant
restraint which the plaintiff failed to use, is a denial of due
process.
In Juster Bros., Inc. v. Christgau,90 the Minnesota Supreme
83. Id. at 216-17.
84. Id. at 217.
85. Id.
86. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
87. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 457 (1890).
88. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 7.
89. Id. at § 8.
90. 214 Minn. 108, 7 N.W.2d 501 (1943).
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Court was confronted with an administrative regulation en-
acted pursuant to legislative authority which allowed a state
commission to make a binding determination of an employer's
social security contribution rate without affording the em-
ployer an opportunity to be heard and to show the actual facts
bearing upon the rate. The employer, a corporation, sought to
have the administrative rule declared unconstitutional as viola-
tive of its constitutional rights. The Minnesota Supreme Court
struck down the rule, holding that the rule did deprive the em-
ployer of due process by effectively precluding the employer
from presenting evidence.9 ' The court stated, "Even the legis-
lature itself does not have the power to declare what should be
conclusive evidence contrary to the fact." 92
The seat belt evidence gag rule, which denies the automo-
bile manufacturer the right to defend itself by demonstrating
that it has indeed considered the importance of occupant re-
straint and designed an occupant restraint system of which the
seat belt is an integral part, effectively denies the manufacturer
its day in court. Therefore, the seat belt evidence gag rule is
contrary to the holding of the Minnesota Supreme Court in
Juster Bros.:
The legislature cannot in this manner provide for the arbi-
trary exercise of power, so as to deprive a person of his day
in court to vindicate his rights. And the law which closes his
mouth absolutely when he comes into court is the same, in
effect, as the law which deprives him of his day in court....
The due process of law clauses of our state and federal
constitutions are "standing guarantee[s] of substantial jus-
tice, and prevent such caprice or arbitrary action as would
prevent a litigant from having a substantially fair trial. The
requirement of due process means opportunity for a hear-
ing, i.e., opportunity to be present during the taking of tes-
timony or evidence, to know the nature and contents of all
evidence adduced in the matter, and to present any relevant
contentions and evidence the party may have. In other
words, that the party have his 'day in court.' -s
Later Minnesota cases have repeatedly emphasized the im-
portant due process right to present important and relevant
91. Id. at 117-20, 7 N.W.2d at 507-08.
92. Id. at 117, 7 N.W.2d at 507 (citations omitted).
93. Id. at 117-19, 7 N.W.2d at 507.
[Vol. 15
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evidence. In Yeager v. Chapman,94 the court stated that eviden-
tiary rules must provide "a reasonable opportunity to present
all pertinent and material evidence, without the imposition of
burdensome restrictions. . .. -95 Again, in O'Neil v. Dux,96 the
Minnesota Supreme Court stated:
Under both the state and Federal constitutions the defend-
ant is guaranteed his day in court to defend any proceed-
ings brought against him. These provisos for fair hearing
assure to the litigant the right to be present when circum-
stances will permit, the right to place evidence in the rec-
ord, and the right to receive reasonable and adequate
notice of the same proceedings. 97
To apply the seat belt evidence gag rule in a crashworthiness
case is to deny the manufacturer its day in court. The statute
violates the requirements of due process of law as applied to
vehicle manufacturers in crashworthiness cases in which it is
alleged that injuries are a result of defective design of the vehi-
cle's occupant restraint system.
E. The Seat Belt Evidence Gag Rule is in Conflict with Minnesota's
Comparative Fault Statute
Minnesota Statutes section 604.01, subdivision 1, provides
in pertinent part:
Contributory fault shall not bar recovery in an action by any
person or the person's legal representative to recover dam-
ages for fault resulting in death or in injury to person or
property, if the contributory fault was not greater than the
fault of the person against whom recovery is sought, but any
damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion to the
amount of fault attributable to the person recovering.98
Subdivision l(a) then defines "fault" to include "acts or
omissions that are in any measure negligent or reckless toward
the person or property of the actor or others, or that subject a
person to strict tort liability" and "misuse of a product and
unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to mitigate
damages."99
94. 233 Minn. 1, 45 N.W.2d 776 (1951).
95. Id. at 10, 45 N.W.2d at 782.
96. 257 Minn. 383, 101 N.W.2d 588 (1960).
97. Id. at 387, 101 N.W.2d at 592 (citation omitted).
98. MINN. STAT. § 604.01, subd. 1 (1988).
99. Id. at subd. l(a).
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Under the plain wording of this statute, an individual's fail-
ure to use reasonable care for his own safety and to avoid an
injury by buckling up a seat belt clearly constitutes fault which
must diminish the plaintiff's damages. The seat belt evidence
gag rule is in direct conflict with the comparative fault statute.
By precluding the introduction of evidence of nonuse of seat
belts, the gag rule effectively precludes the determination of
comparative fault on the part of the plaintiff which is required
by the comparative fault statute.
The comparative fault statute requires the jury to compare
all fault which contributed to cause the plaintiff's injuries. 0 0 If
the seat belt evidence gag rule is applied in a crashworthiness
case where the plaintiff was unbelted, the jury will be asked to
do the impossible task of comparing all the fault which contrib-
uted to the plaintiff's injuries without being able to consider
evidence on one essential element-the plaintiff's actions in
failing to exercise reasonable care for his own safety by wear-
ing a seat belt.
Not allowing the jury to consider the plaintiff's fault in fail-
ing to use an available and effective safety device also violates
the principles of the crashworthiness doctrine. The
crashworthiness doctrine requires the jury to determine all
causes of the injuries sustained in an accident, not only the
cause of the occurrence of the accident itself. Where the inju-
ries were sustained because of impact with interior compo-
nents of the vehicle or due to ejection, and it is claimed that
the vehicle was not sufficiently designed to guard against inte-
rior impacts or ejection, the safety devices designed and placed
into the vehicle for crash protection and occupant retention-
most notably seat belts-and their use by the plaintiff are cru-
cial elements in the jury's determination. The jury simply can-
not do its job in a crashworthiness case, especially in a
comparative fault jurisdiction, without being allowed to con-
sider the manufacturer's installation of a simple and effective
safety device in the vehicle and the plaintiff's failure to use it.
Neither the crashworthiness doctrine nor comparative fault
existed at the time the gag rule was enacted in 1963. It must
be assumed that the gag rule was intended only to apply in
ordinary driver negligence cases, since that was the only type
of case in existence at the time. The legislature simply could
100. Id. at subd. 1.
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not have intended the gag rule to apply in a crashworthiness
case-a concept which had never been considered at the time.
Even if a negligent driver who causes an accident should not
be entitled to a reduction of plaintiff's damages because plain-
tiff failed to wear his seat belt, the comparative fault statute
requires that the seat belt defense be made available in a
crashworthiness case to a vehicle manufacturer which has
designed a safety feature into its vehicle which could have pre-
vented the plaintiff's injuries if the plaintiff had used it.
F. Application of the Seat Belt Evidence Gag Rule in
Crashworthiness Cases Will Cause Jury Confusion
The jury in a crashworthiness case hears evidence that the
plaintiff's injuries were sustained by impact with interior com-
ponents of the vehicle or objects outside the vehicle after the
plaintiff was ejected. Plaintiff's experts invariably give opin-
ions that the vehicle was defectively designed in that it did not
provide adequate crash protection or occupant retention in
collisions. With the "second collision" injuries being the cen-
tral issue in the case, and in light of today's wide acceptance of
seat belts and the general knowledge of their effectiveness in
preventing ejection, the jury will expect to hear evidence on
whether seat belts were available and used.
If the seat belt evidence gag rule is applied, the jury will wait
in vain for the evidence it expects to hear. Since plaintiff was
indeed thrown about in the car or ejected, the jury will cer-
tainly speculate that either plaintiff was not wearing a seat belt
or the belt malfunctioned or was not available. The jury will
have no evidence on the issue, so it will only be able to guess.
The jury may very well apply its own seat belt defense, con-
cluding that plaintiff was negligent in failing to wear a seat belt
and reducing damages accordingly without any judicial gui-
dance. On the other hand, the jury may speculate that seat
belts were not available in the car or that they did not work,
improperly holding this against the manufacturer on the deter-
mination of design defect.
Excluding evidence of nonuse of seat belts in a case where
occupant restraint is the central issue makes no sense. This
can result only in the jury's own application of a self-fashioned
seat belt defense, without any limiting instruction or guidance
19891
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from the court. The jury cannot be expected to ignore such an
obvious issue.
CONCLUSION
The seat belt evidence gag rule of Minnesota Statutes sec-
tion 169.685, subdivision 4, is antiquated and out of step with
today's knowledge of the effectiveness of seat belts. The wide
acceptance of seat belts, the spreading recognition that there is
a duty to wear seat belts, and the adoption of comparative fault
have made the old gag rule a dinosaur.
Even if there were good policy reasons for continuing to ap-
ply the gag rule in ordinary automobile negligence cases, it has
no place in crashworthiness cases. In a crashworthiness case
where occupant restraint is the central issue, the jury must be
allowed to consider the manufacturer's installation of seat
belts as a primary means of occupant restraint, as well as a
plaintiff's comparative fault in failing to use this simple and
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